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BALANCE SHEET OF APPOINTED COUNSEL IN LOUISIANA
CRIMINAL CASES
Under early Anglo-Saxon criminal law, the accused charged with
a serious felony was expressly denied the aid of legal counsel.' The
Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution rejected this harsh
common law rule and guaranteed that "[imn all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense."'2 The constitutional right of an indigent
defendant to the assistance of court appointed counsel was recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama' and
expanded in Gideon v. Wainwright.4 The most recent judicial inter-
pretation of the right to counsel appears in Argersinger v. Hamlin,'
which held that no person may be imprisoned for any offense, unless
represented by counsel at his trial."
The results of surveys vary,7 but studies indicate that from 50%'
1. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *355.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; accord, LA. CONST. art. I, § 9. For an excellent history
of the right to counsel, see NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO
THE NATIONAL DEFENDERS CONFERENCE 1 (1969).
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
6. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to ap-
pointed counsel should not be limited to the trial alone. See, e.g., Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155 (1957). The point of attachment of the right to appointed counsel has been
characterized as the crucial stage of the proceedings where substantial rights of the
accused may be affected. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary
examination); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (in prison); Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128 (1967) (at probation violation hearing); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) (at post indictment line up); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (at
post indictment line up); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juvenile proceedings); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation); White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59 (1963) (preliminary hearing). But see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(not at pre-indictment identification).
Argersinger has replaced the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy with a jail-fine dis-
tinction. At least one state has extended appointed counsel to all criminal prosecu-
tions. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a)
(every defendant). See also State v. Coody, 275 So. 2d 773, 775 (La. 1973) where the
Louisiana supreme court, in response to Argersinger stated: "[Wie must change our
practice in respect to misdemeanors which may carry a prison sentence and must
afford an accused charged with such a misdemeanor the same rights in regard to
counsel afforded a defendant on trial for a felony." (Emphasis added.)
7. L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 7-11 (1965) [hereinafter cited as DEFENSE
OF THE POOR].
8. Note, 18 DE PAUL L. REV. 243, 249-50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DE PAUL];
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to 90% of all Argersinger defendants will be financially unable to
retain private counsel. The need for critical analysis of the socio-
economic considerations which determine an "indigent""' and the
paramount importance of proper determination of eligibility for court
appointed counsel are apparent.
In virtually all Louisiana parishes, the trial court has no explicit
criteria for determining a defendant's eligibility for court appointed
counsel." However, R.S. 15:142(N),"2 though applicable to only three
cf. Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoner's Need for Legill Services in the
Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493, 509 (1970).
9. Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
MINN. REPORTI.
10. The requirement of indigency is a throwback to the English poor law and
connotes a total absence of financial resources. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED
STATES SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 23 (Comm. Print 1969)
[hereinafter cited OAKS REPORT]. "The term 'indigency' is avoided because of its
implication that only an accused who is destitute may need appointed counsel or
services." Letter of Transmittal from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy, H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See also Hardy
v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 (1964) (concurring opinion).
11. The prevailing attitude among trial judges is that they will know an indigent
when they see one. "Judges and commissioners whom we interviewed almost uniformly
declared that there was seldom any doubt as to whether or not an individual defendant
qualified ...." OAKS REPORT 26. See also Evans & Ross, Legal Aid in New Zealand
and Abroad, 5 NEW ZEALAND U. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1972) (trial judge appoints counsel "in
the interest of justice").
There is generally no procedure to determine eligibility. "The strongest impression
that emerges from a review of these data is that many of the sample counties have very
little system at all." DEFENSE OF THE POOR 105. Accord, Letter from Donald K. Tsuki-
yana, Public Defender, State of Hawaii, to Criminal Justice Program, L.S.U. Law
Center [hereinafter cited as CJP1, July 11, 1972 (no guidelines); Letter from Jacob
L. Safron, Asst. Att'y Gen., State of N.C., to CJP, July 11, 1972 (no guidelines or
criteria). Cf. State v. Wright, 281 N.C. 38, 187 S.E.2d 721 (1972); Letter from Donald
S. Young, Chief Asst. Att'y Gen., State of Utah, to CJP, Aug. 8, 1972 (no statutory
criteria); Letter from Gary E. Wegner, Asst. Att'y Gen., State of Wash., to CJP, July
17, 1972 (no state wide criteria); Note, 47 TUL. L. REV. 446, 447 n.6 (1973): "At present
there is no uniform method among the states for determining indigency. With the right
to court-appointed counsel now expanded, it becomes even more imperative that a
uniform definition of indigency be adopted and applied by the states .... "
12. LA. R.S. 15:142(N) (Supp. 1972) (originally enacted as Act 616 of 1972):
(1) The determination of insolvency of any accused person shall be made by the court
and may be done at any stage of the proceedings. The public defender shall be allowed
process of the court to summon witnesses to testify before the court concerning the
financial ability of any accused person to employ counsel for his own defense.
(2) In proceedings for the determination of insolvency there shall be a presumption
of solvency and the defendant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption by
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judicial districts, 13 does delineate express standards. It is the purpose
of this Comment to set forth criteria for the appointment of counsel
by detailed analysis of the Louisiana Act in light of the experience of
other jurisdictions, and to offer suggestions for a state-wide imple-
mentation of some of the Act's provisions.
Definition of Indigency
In Louisiana, a defendant who is financially unable to procure
counsel is deemed "indigent" 4 for the purposes of court appointed
legal counsel.'" The defendant must declare under oath that he de-
sires an attorney, but is unable to retain private counsel."t The court
competent proof. The following facts shall be prima facie evidence of solvency:
(a) That the defendant has been released on bail in the amount of fifteen hundred
dollars or more and said bill was deposited in cash or the defendant deposited a
commercial bailbond.
(b) That the defendant has no dependents and his gross income exceeds seventy-five
dollars per week; the income limit shall be increased by ten dollars per week for each
of the first two dependents of the defendant and by five dollars per week for each
dependent beyond the first two;
(c) That the defendant owns cash in excess of three hundred dollars.
(3) The court shall also consider the following additional circumstances in determin-
ing insolvency:
(a) The probable expense and burden of defending the case;
(b) The ownership of, or an equity, in any intangible or tangible personal property
or real property or the expectancy of an interest in any such property by the defendant;
and
(c) The amount of debts owed by defendant or debts that might be incurred by the
defendant because of illness or other misfortunes with his family.
13. Act 616 of 1972 created the Office of Public Defender for the Seventh, Eight-
eenth and Twenty-Second Judicial Districts. The act provides detailed criteria to
determine the eligibility of the accused for appointed counsel, some of which shall be
prima facie evidence of solvency, while others shall be considered as additional circum-
stances in determining insolvency.
14. United States Supreme Court opinions have referred to "indigent" defendants
without offering any concise definition, and very few state statutes have chosen to
elaborate. Comment, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 34, 36 (1972). State judicial definition is infre-
quent and inconsistent. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 53 (app. draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES]; accord, People v. Morris, 30 Mich. App. 169,
170, 186 N.W.2d 10, 11 (1971) (indigency impossible to define); REPORT OF THE ArroR-
NEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 7-8 (1963) [hereinafter cited as the ALLEN REPORT after its chairman, Dean
Frances A. Allen] (indigency difficult to define).
15. LA. R.S. 15:141(F) (Supp. 1972); LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 513.
16. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 513; LA. R.S. 15:141(F) (Supp. 1972); LA. R.S.
15:142(N) (Supp. 1972). See State v. Blankenship, 186 La. 238, 172 So. 4 (1937) (oath
sufficient to assert inability to employ counsel). But mandatory counsel, without re-
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shall then determine the defendant's eligibility for appointment.'7 In
determining eligibility, there is a presumption of solvency and the
accused has the burden of rebuttal. 8 However, this presumption is
contrary to recognized economic reality, as documented evidence
shows that the vast majority of defendants are not financially able
to retain counsel." The jurisprudence of other states holds that in
marginal cases, doubt should be resolved in favor of appointed coun-
sel for the defendant." Since the issue is one of constitutional right
to counsel, and not a mere gratuity, the presumption of solvency
should not be strictly construed by the trial court.
2
'
gard to need, is provided where the defendant, charged with a capital offense appears
at arraignment unrepresented by an attorney, or where the question of mental capacity
of the accused is raised. LA. R.S. 15:141(F) (Supp. 1972). "Such assignment of counsel
will be automatic. It will not be dependent upon indigency of the unrepresented defen-
dant .... " LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 512, comment (a).
17. Many trial judges are reluctant to deny defendant's request for appointed
counsel, in a good faith effort to administer equal justice to all. Other judges will
seldom deny requested counsel because they are overly sensitive of their "track record"
at the appellate bench.
Although trial court determination is the usual procedure throughout the country,
"[ilt is suggested, however, that in any system it is generally not necessary for a
judicial officer to go through the tedium of ascertaining all the information required
before appointment takes place." NATIONAL DEFENDER PROJECT, NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENDER CONFERENCE 40 (1969).
Administrative determination might be made a regular part of the booking process,
subject to judicial review and confirmation. See OAKS REPORT 26; STANDARDS OF DE-
FENSE SERVICES 56. But see Mathis, Financial Inability to Obtain an Adequate Defense,
49 NEB. L. REV. 37, 61 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 49 NEa. L. REV.] (delegation of
determination unwise). A magistrate, an agent of the court who evaluates for release
on recognizance, or a public defender could be integrated into the initial processing of
a defendant after his arrest and could easily make an initial recommendation where
appropriate. At any rate, "it is imperative that a means be provided to make a deter-
mination of eligibility as soon as possible after a person is taken into custody."
STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES 56. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.17 (Supp. 1965);
49 NEB. L. REV. at 61 (magistrate); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE § 5.1 (app. draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as STANDARDS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE] (R.o.R. agent); ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.120(b)
(Supp. 1969); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27707 (Supp. 1969) (public defender to defend denial
of counsel); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-3(3) (1963); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1804(3)
(Supp. 1972).
18. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(2) (Supp. 1972). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(2)(a) (Supp.
1971).
This writer was unable to verify the exact source of LA. R.S. 15:142(N), but the
similarity to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52 (Supp. 1971) is noted.
19. See text at note 8 supra.
20. See State v. Allen, 105 Ariz. 267, 463 P.2d 65 (1969) (presumption of indigency
in marginal cases); Hooks v. State, 253 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1971) (doubt of indigency
resolved in favor of accused), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1044 (1972).
21. It is suggested that a needy defendant who at the time of determination is
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Assets of the Defendant
Bail
The Louisiana Act, following the majority approach,2" provides
that an accused is prima facie solvent if he has been released on bail
in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars or more.': However, the
utilization of bail as an element of determination places the defen-
dant in the questionable dilemma of having to choose between legal
representation or liberty pending trial. 4 Since the defendant's pre-
trial liberty may be essential to trial preparations, the quandary may
be a denial of his right to an effective defense.
In order to avoid this dilemma, courts should not consider the
defendant's posting of a commercial bond as definitive. In such a
case, even upon punctual appearance at trial, the bond fee is lost as
an asset to the accused. On the other hand, where the defendant posts
a cash bond, this bond should be considered an asset of the accused
unable, without substantial hardship to himself or his family, to provide for payment
of an attorney and all other necessary expenses is eligible for appointed counsel.
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL DEFENSE OF NEEDY PERSONS ACT § 1(3)
[hereinafter cited as NEEDY PERSONS ACTI; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5236 (Supp.
1971). See also STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.1 at 10; cf. ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.85.170(40) (Supp. 1969); MINN. REPORT 21.
22. In states that consider bail as a factor: (1) Bail renders accused ineligible for
appointed counsel (21 counties in 11 states); (2) Bail was primary test of eligibility (40
counties in 25 states); (3) Bail a factor, but not dominant (181 counties in 41 states).
DEFENSE OF THE POOR 107. A few jurisdictions do not consider bail as a factor. See
People v. Eggers, 27 Ill. 2d 85, 188 N.E.2d 30 (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3001 to -
3003 (Supp. 1968); ARIZONA STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL LAW, PROPOSED RULES
OF CRIM. P. § 6.4, comment at 21 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED ARIZ. RULES];
NEEDY PERSONS ACT § 4(b); DEFENSE OF THE POOR 107 (release on bail not considered
at all in 31 counties in 15 states). But see MINN. REPORT 31: "Obviously, a person who
has raised bail is less likely to be indigent than one who has not. It hardly follows,
however, that all persons out on bail are non-indigent."
23. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(2)(a) (Supp. 1972): "That the defendant has been released
on bail in the amount of fifteen hundred dollars or more and said bail was deposited
in cash or the defendant deposited a commercial bailbond." But see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.52(b)(1) (Supp. 1971) (makes no mention of commercial bond).
24. STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.1, comment c, at 55. The institution of
bail as a facet of the criminal justice system has been much criticized and its function
as a factor in determining eligibility for appointed counsel is suspect. See generally
OAKS REPORT 28-29; STANDARDS OF PRETRIAL RELEASE; J. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN
THE UNITED STATES (prepared as a working paper for the National Conference on Bail
and Criminal Justice in Washington, D.C., 1964); R. MOLLEUR, BAIL REFORM IN THE
NATION'S CAPITAL (1966); Botein, The Manhattan Bail Project: Its Impact on Criminol-
ogy and the Criminal Law Processes, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 319 (1965); Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125 (1965).
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since it will be returned in toto upon appearance at trial." However,
this should be only one factor in the total determination of eligibility.
Income
The Act further provides that a defendant with a gross income
exceeding seventy-five dollars per week is prima facie solvent.2 The
income limit is increased ten dollars per week for each of the first two
dependants, and five dollars for each additional dependant. The in-
come limit has been criticized,27 because "no dollar standard of in-
come or assets can be established which will serve the purpose."28 At
least one court has expressly rejected a higher fixed 5cale income level
($85.00 per week with no dependants) as inadequate and the trend is
toward a more dynamic approach to income evaluation, taking into
consideration such volatile factors as inflation and rural-urban cost
of living differences. As a result, one state has wisely proposed the
federal minimum hourly wage as a criteria." Finally, current income
should be considered only to the extent that it will continue, notwith-
standing the defendant's arrest and pre-trial confinement, and then
only as one factor in the eligibility determination.
Although the statute provides a gross income figure, the impro-
priety of charging toward the defendant's ability to employ counsel
mandatory deductions such as income tax and union dues, is obvious.
A better position would be to consider only net income, and then only
in a relative view toward the entire economic picture of the accused.
Cash
The Act finally provides that a defendant who owns cash in
25. However, friends, relatives or employers may be willing to post a cash bond,
being confident the accused will appear at court, but be unwilling or unable to finance
attorney fees. Since this cash is not at the disposal of the defendant upon his appear-
ance, it should not be considered an asset.
26. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(2)(b) (Supp. 1972).
27. "Standards that allow determination of financial eligibility solely on a fixed
scale of specific income levels . . .should not be established." NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK OF STANDARDS FOR LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
OFFICES 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as DEFENDER HANDBOOK]. See OAKS REPORT 63
(prior earning level considered only if retained as net asset available for defense ex-
penditures); Comment, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 40 n.35 (1972): "In the long run, such factors
lead to the human tendency to bureaucratize the whole process of analysis."
28. STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES § 6.1, comment a, at 53.
29. Samuel v. United States, 420 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1969) (defendant with weekly
salary of $85.00-$90.00 per week, no dependents, no property or money was indigent).
30. Letter from Gerald Grieman, Spec. Asst. Att'y Gen., State of Minnesota, to
CJP, Aug. 16, 1972.
1973]
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excess of three hundred dollars is prima facie solvent." Should a
defendant with cash assets in excess of three hundred dollars, but in
fact unable to employ retained counsel because of the unpopularity
of his cause, or the gravity of the offense be considered eligible for
appointed counsel? Reason would certainly support appointment.32
The three hundred dollars figure appears to suffer the same defect of
rigidity as does a fixed level of income.33
Property
The Act also provides as an additional factor in determining
insolvency "Itihe ownership of, or an equity, in any intangible or
tangible personal property or real property or the expectancy of an
interest in any such property by the defendant .... ."I' Generally,
personal movable property encompasses all individual and household
possessions of the defendant."2 Since such property is usually a neces-
sary adjunct to family existence, personal assets should not normally
be considered as a fee source. Furthermore, most personal property
is not the object of active commercial transactions, thus being diffi-
cult to assess and possessing a nominal resale value.3" However, per-
sonal luxury items could reasonably be ordered sold. 7
Immovable property of the defendant should generally not be
considered as a fee source where the property involved is the mort-
gaged residence." A mortgaged house usually has little convertible
equity, and payments approximate rent, being a legitimate necessary
family expense." However, where the immovable property in ques-
31. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(2)(c) (Supp. 1972). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(3) (Supp.
1971).
32. Counsel, appointed to represent an unpopular, but not needy, defendant
should be allowed a reasonable fee commensurate with the services provided, and not
paid according to an indigency fee schedule. See OAKS REPORT 45.
33. See note 27 supra.
34. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(3)(b) (Supp. 1972). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(3)(C)(2)
(Supp. 1971).
35. See DE PAUL at 258.
36. How does the trial judge appraise the value of thirty-six coon hounds? Unfor-
tunately, the defendant had to give the dogs away before the decision was rendered
because he could no longer afford to feed them. See generally 49 NEB. L. REV. at 53
(1969); Timber, Judicial Prospectives on the Operation of the Criminal Justice Act of
1964, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 55, 58-59 (1967).
37. See State v. Bernal, 474 P.2d 864 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (refusal to sell late
model car was voluntary and intentional waiver of counsel).
38. See DE PAUL at 258.
39. Cf. Rast v. State, 77 Fla. 225, 81 So. 523 (1919) (accused owned real property
valued at $18,000 but was unable to realize money by loan or mortgage); People v.
[Vol. 34
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tion is not a residence, the property should be considered as a con-
vertible asset unless it is low in value and the defendant relies on the
property as his sole means of income."'
Automobiles have caused courts in other jurisdictions more diffi-
culty than any other single item of property." Since an auto sale is a
common business transaction, and the market value is easily ascer-
tainable, a luxury car certainly should be subject to court ordered sale
for the purpose of retaining counsel. However, a different answer
should result where the auto in question is a modest type, or is the
business vehicle of the accused. This car should be classified as a
necessity, not a liquid asset, and not subject to ordered sale.
Finally, the Louisiana statute provides that "the expectancy of
an interest in any such property by the defendant' '42 is to be consid-
ered as a factor in determining insolvency. However, courts should
recognize the fact that few lawyers will accept employment in ex-
change for the speculative asset of an uncertain hope.'3 "[I]ncome
or resources obtained after these events . .. is a separate question
that ought not to affect the defendant's eligibility for counsel or serv-
ices which he presently needs but has no means of providing.""
Collateral Assets of the Defendant
The Act makes no mention of the impact on eligibility of collat-
eral assets of either the spouse or parents of the accused. There is a
split of authority in other jurisdictions as to whether the resources of
the defendant's spouse should be considered as an asset for the pur-
pose of determining eligibility for appointed counsel. "For the most
part, resources of the spouse are considered a disqualificaton . . .
only if the resources are community property."'" The spouse's sepa-
rate assets should not be included where the court determines that
because of marital estrangement or other reason, the spouse's sepa-
rate assets will not in fact be available for providing defendant's
Griffin, 22 Mich. App. 101, 177 N.W.2d 213 (1970) (defendant lost equity in divorce
settlement).
40. A classic example would be a defendant who operates a T.V. repair shop with
assets being the lease on the small shop and the repair equipment and tools. Liquida-
tion of this business would be unwise and unjust.
41. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Beard v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1970)
(finding of indigency clearly erroneous where defendant had two cars and no showing
of debt).
42. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(3)(b) (Supp. 1972).
43. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2451.
44. OAKS REPORT 63.
45. STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVIcEs 54, as quoted from DEFENSE OF THE POOR 109.
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defense." Moreover, in the analogous determination of eligibility for
appeal in forma pauperis, most of the recent cases have held that the
separate resources of the spouse or relative should not be considered.47
The better approach is to consider only the defendant's patrimony
since
the question in inquiries as to insolvency is not whether the de-
fendant's supposed friends or spouse or relatives have the ability
or readiness or willingness to provide the funds, but whether the
defendant personally has the means, or property which can be
converted to the means, to employ an attorney to represent him."
Since parents are generally not responsible for the crimes of their
children,4" judges usually ignore the income or resources of parents in
determining the eligibility of juveniles brought before them." The
"privileged pauper"'" college student will often claim to be indigent
for appointed counsel. One recent Illinois case has held that counsel
should not be denied a college student on the basis that parents, with
whom the student lived during the summer and provided full support
for the education, could easily have afforded defense costs, but re-
fused.52 The Louisiana courts ought to reach the same result. Since
the Louisiana Act conspicuously dropped the parental responsibility
provision of the Florida statute while enacting the remainder verba-
tim, it appears that the intent of the Louisiana legislature was to
consider only the defendant's assets, not the parent's.
Liabilities of the Accused
Debts
Under the Act, the court shall consider "[t]he amount of debts
46. See OAKS REPORT 31.
47. STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES 54; accord, State v. Owen, 97 Ariz. 250, 399
P.2d 660 (1965); State v. Vallejos, 87 Ariz. 119, 348 P.2d 554 (1960); Lawrence v. State,
76 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1954); Gaston v. State, 106 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958).
48. Keur v. State, 160 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964) (Emphasis added.);
accord, Swilley v. State, 76 Fla. 173, 79 So. 715 (1918).
49. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 123, at 869 (4th ed. 1971).
50. OAKS REPORT 29-30. See PROPOSED ARIZ. RULES 21. But see State ex rel. Butler
v. Allen Cir. Ct., 241 Ind. 627, 170 N.E.2d 663 (1961) (parents have duty to provide
counsel for child).
51. Comment, 4 ST. MARY'S L.J. 45 (1972).
52. People v. Gustavson, 131 II. App. 2d 887, 269 N.E.2d 517 (1971). A possible
abuse of this position was reported where a prominent attorney refused to fund his
son's defense in a criminal case. However, his refusal was upheld by the court. OAKS
REPORT 29.
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owed by the defendant or debts that might be incurred by the defen-
dant because of illness or other misfortunes within his family. ''i3 The
latter clause appears to take into consideration the normal economic
reversals that are often a by-product of an arrest (i.e., loss of job), and
represents a recognition of the familial responsibility which will pers-
ist during the pre-trial period.-
The Act does not expressly provide for inclusion, as a liability,
of vital personal and family expenses such as food, shelter, or medi-
cine.", The court should interpret "debt" to also include familial
obligations of support, and rightfully add this important considera-
tion to the defendant's liabilities.,'
Defense Cost
"The probable expense and burden of defending the case" shall
also be considered by the trial court. 7 The estimated fee must take
into account the gravity of the offense charged.
If a man faces a charge of robbery, rape, or first degree murder,
and is looking at substantial attorneys' fees for his defense even
though he has a good job, he may well be indigent as opposed to
a man who faces a charge of careless driving or an illegal left turn,
or petty theft .... 56
The actual cost of retained counsel will vary from city to city,
depending upon the prevailing rate at the bar.5 This provision should
be interpreted to guarantee an adequate defense,6 always presuming
53. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(3)(c) (Supp. 1972). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(3)(C)(3)
(Supp. 1971).
54. For three cases where debts were the crucial factor in determination of eligibil-
ity, see Grimes v. State, 278 N.E.2d 271 (Ind. 1972); State v. Cradle, 281 N.C. 198,
188 S.E.2d 296 (1972); State v. Right, 281 N.C. 38, 187 S.E.2d 761 (1972).
55. But see STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES 54.
56. See Anderson v. Stae, 85 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1956) (defendant with income barely
able to support family eligible).
57. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(3)(a) (Supp. 1972). Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(3)(C)(1)
(Supp. 1971). See the interesting situation in Baker v. State, 42 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1949)
where the defendant sold property valued at $8,000.00, paid bond, retained seven
lawyers, but was held indigent on appeal.
58. Letter from Rollie R. Rogers, Colo. State Public Defender, to CJP, July 14,
1972.
59. Average retainer would range from a high of over $5,000.00 for serious felonies
to a low under $100.00 for a minor crime.
60. Competent defense, and its exact definition is the subject of present debate.
As yet, there is no agreement as to difference between a Homeric nod of counsel, and
incompetent defense. See Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 740 (1973).
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that any charge will go fully to trial, and not anticipate a possible
guilty plea."' Finally, a court may properly consider whether the trial
is to be before a judge alone, or a jury, as this fact will have a bearing
on the retainer demanded by private counsel. 2
The cost of supporting legal services' should also be considered
in estimating, the "probable expense and burden of defending the
case.""' Although most courts have held that there is no constitu-
tional obligation to provide an indigent defendant with supporting
services,"5 the Louisiana Act should be construed to include this assis-
tance.'" If so construed, the trial court could utilize pre-trial discovery
procedures to eliminate expensive duplication of effort. 7
Part Payment of Appointed Counsel
If the defendant is financially able to afford counsel, the trial
court informs him that he is ineligible and advises him to retain a
private lawyer." Thus the Louisiana Act presents an "all or nothing"
approach to eligibility. The better view is that defendant's ability to
pay part of the cost of his defense should not preclude state assis-
tance. Louisiana should follow the lead of other jurisdictions which
have enacted a part payment scheme in order to protect the constitu-
61. See OAKS REPORT 25.
62. See 49 NEB. L. REV. at 51.
63. The crucial importance of adequate supporting defense services is emphasized
in NEEDY PERSONS ACT § 2(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1970); OAKS REPORT 55;
STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.5 at 7, 22-24.
64. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(3)(a) (Supp. 1972).
65. STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES 23. See, e.g., State v. Crose, 88 Ariz. 389, 357
P.2d 136 (1960). But see State ex rel. Marshall v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 80 Nev. 478,
396 P.2d 680 (1964). Trial lawyers uniformly stress the crucial importance of adequate
investigation, expert witnesses, examination and testing. See Note, 47 MINN. L. REV.
1054, 1060-61 (1963). The quality of representation at trial may be excellent, yet
valueless if the defense requires supporting services and none are available. STANDARDS
OF DEFENSE SERVICES 23. Several states have provided supporting services to indigents
by statute. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 914.06 (Supp. 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 113-3(e) (1969); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 308 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 784
(1964).
66. It can be stated that one of the assumptions of the adversary system is that
counsel for the defense will have at his disposal the tools essential to the conduct of a
proper defense.
67. See ADVISORY COMMIrrEE-CONTINUOUS REVISION OF [LA.] CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL CODE, PROPOSED DISCOVERY PROCEDURE, March 30, 1973.
68. A practical test to determine whether defendant is able to afford retained
counsel would be whether he can do so when he is informed of being ineligible. A strong
argument can be made that if the defendant is in fact unable to retain counsel, his
eligibility should be reconsidered for possible appointment.
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tional right to counsel of the defendant and conserve the state's lim-
ited financial resources."
Procedural Safeguards
"[Tihe most widely felt abuse of the assignment system is the
false claim of indigency to obtain free counsel."7" It would appear that
greater confidence in the ability of retained counsel, coupled with
general suspicion of all court appointed lawyers as mere instruments
of the state, would check fraudulent claims; however, the opposite
has often been shown to be the case.7 The Louisiana Act does not
prescribe a uniform procedure implementing its stated criteria. Au-
thorities suggest three steps to not only reduce false claims, but also
insure that adequate reliable information is provided uniformly to all
trial judges. First, there should be a complete financial disclosure
under oath on a standard questionaire. 2 Second, each claim should
be investigated. 3 Although it has been contended that extensive in-
69. DEFENSE OF THE POOR 112. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-309 (Supp. 1968).
70. Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 585 (1963); accord, OAKS REPORT 33: "Many
members of the bar and U.S. attorneys felt that a significant proportion of defendants
are guilty of cheating on the eligibility standards."
71. Where an established public defender office has a reputation of trust in the
community, or where it is generally known that appointments usually come from a
select criminal bar, highly experienced and greatly respected, defendant would be
tempted to cheat on claims, not wanting the inferior counsel that his meager means
could provide. Finally, the bare economic advantage to the defendant of receiving
gratis counsel cannot be overlooked. See generally OAKS REPORT at 37.
72. The Louisiana supreme court, in the absence of legislative initiative, could
promulgate a standard application questionaire for appointment of counsel. This step
would assure that uniform information is provided all judges throughout the state,
while retaining appointing authority at the trial level. See DEFENSE OF THE POOR 116.
Note the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has promulgated an application form for
assignment of counsel. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3209 (Supp. 1968) (Superior court may
prescribe questionaire to be used by all courts within the county) Defendant's refusal
to provide information is generally held to be a waiver of counsel. See Quilivan v.
State, 94 Idaho 334, 487 P.2d 928 (1971).
73. The type of investigation would depend largely upon the size and resources of
the community. See STANDARDS OF DEFENSE SERVICES 58. In smaller cities, the clerk of
court or the sheriff could verify the information provided by the defendant in his
application for counsel. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 318(8) (Supp. 1971) (Judge may
order sheriff to investigate defendant's financial condition.) In larger communities, the
judge could utilize the services of the welfare agency, or department of probation and
parole. See Martin, Legal Aid in Ontario, 10 CANADIAN B.J. 473, 480 (1967) (application
of defendant investigated by welfare officer); Letter from Howard J. Camuso, Asst.
Att'y Gen., State of Mass., to CJP, July 10, 1972. Depending upon the case load, part-
time investigators may best serve a moderate size community, whereas in the larger
cities, full time investigators would entail minimal cost in comparison to the resulting
benefits. See DE PAUL at 263.
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vestigation would cost more than it would be worth,"4 the value of
investigating all claims is twofold: the deterrent force would discour-
age potential defrauders who would then regard detection as a real
possibility, and those who oppose appointed counsel for indigents
would be more receptive if they knew all claims were being verified.
Thirdly, there should be prosecution and reimbursement of misrepre-
sentation by defendants.
The Louisiana Act provides that if within one year after determi-
nation of insolvency, the trial court shall adjudge that an accused was
erroneously or improperly determined to be insolvent, the district
attorney may proceed against such accused for the reasonable value
of said services.7" One authority would not require reimbursement to
the state for services except on the ground of fraud in obtaining
appointment."6 This latter approach is commendable, as it does not
attempt to charge a defendant for an admitted error by the state in
determining eligibility.77
Conclusion
A good system to determine eligibility of a defendant for court
appointed counsel has recognizable characteristics. The criteria
should be uniformly applied to all defendants throughout the state,
thus avoiding a possible equal protection infirmity. The system
should provide a thorough investigation of each case in order to mini-
mize appointment to defendants who could afford retained counsel,
yet maximize the availability of counsel to all eligible defendants.
The criteria should be flexible enough to consider the individual cir-
cumstances of each case, and avoid the harsh results of static deter-
mination. The system must consider the whole picture of each case,
and avoid single factor determination. Finally the system should pro-
vide a part payment provision to ensure adequate legal representa-
tion to all defendants, not just the very rich, or the very poor.
The general factors considered in determining indigency should
be analogized to the components in a mathematical equation. The
liquid assets of the defendant, actually available at the time of arrest,
74. Note, 76 HARV. L. REV. 579, 586 (1963).
75. LA. R.S. 15:142(N)(4) (Supp. 1972) Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.52(3) (1963), as
amended by Fla. Laws 1970, c.70-57, § 1. The one year provision represents a lengthy
term, contrasted with the 90 day period for reimbursement recommended by the Needy
Persons Act. See NEEDY PERSONS ACT § 8(a).
76. OAKS REPORT 57.
77. However, this argument would be contrary to the policy of the Internal Reve-
nue Service, where a taxpayer may be charged for an error of the service. See American
Auto Assoc. v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
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should be totaled and from this sum subtracted all debts, expenses
and other obligations. The remainder would be an estimate of the
resources of the defendant available to retain private counsel.
The new Louisiana Act represents an attempt by the legislature
to provide a criteria for determining eligibility of an accused for court
appointed counsel. However it only applies to three judicial districts
of the state, and encourages rigid single factor decisions, without
requiring a thorough analysis of each case. Until revision and state-
wide re-enactment of the Act can be undertaken by the legislature,
Louisiana trial courts should make a thorough evaluation of each
case, basing judgment of indigency upon the total socio-economic
status of the accused, considered in the context of the nature of the
charge, and not deciding on the basis of a sole compartmentalized
factor. The suggested approach will provide a good and fair system,
protecting the respective interests of both the state and the accused.
Joseph W. Rausch
